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Abstract
This paper elaborates on a basic model of mass tort litigation, high-
lighting the existence of positive informational externalities a¤orded by
the discovery process (as a general technology of production of evidences)
in order to study when a class action is formed, or when a sequence of
individual trials is more likely. We illustrate the argument that when sev-
eral plainti¤s le individually a lawsuit against the same tortfeasor, the
resolution of the various cases through repeated trials produces positive
informational externalities. When class actions are forbidden, these exter-
nalities only benet to the later plainti¤s (through precedents, jurispru-
dence...). When they are allowed, the rst lers may have an incentive
to initiate a class action as far as it enables him to benet from these
externalities, through the sharing of information with later lers. We pro-
vide su¢ cient conditions under which a class action is formed, assuming
a perfect discovery process. We also show that when contingent fees are
used to reward attorneysservices, plainti¤s become neutral to the arrival
of new information on their case.
KEYWORDS: Mass Tort Class Action, information sharing, repeated litiga-
tion, contingent fees.
1 Introduction
Informational asymmetries are considered as an important factor to explain the
strategies of litigants to solve legal conicts. However, when parties enter into
the litigation process, they collect evidences, testimonies, expertises and share
many informations during the pretrial negotiation period. Moreover, when there
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is a collective concern, plainti¤s do not enter simultaneously into the litigation
process but rather sequentially, at di¤erent dates. This is the case, for instance,
when victims are injured by the same tortfeasor in a quite long period of time
(e.g. asbestos or tobacco litigation, medical malpractice or product liability). It
follows that some informations of the rst moversbenet to the other, since
as time is passing, new evidences arrive and the state of the art changes.
As a result, some uncertainty is resolved from the time the rst claims are
solved to the period the later plainti¤s le. This implies positive informational
externalities between plainti¤s because later llers benet from the experience of
the rst plainti¤s. These externalities also allow later plainti¤s to update their
beliefs on the likelihood to win at trial. According to this view, class actions may
be understood as a device which allows plainti¤s to internalize informational
externalities. Specically, class actions allow the earlier victims to retain part
of the benets of these externalities, that they would otherwise never recover.
As a consequence, when they participate to a class actions, plainti¤s perceive
in a better way the existence of the correlation between the individual losses.
In other words, plainti¤s would become more condent with their chances of
success at trial against the same defendant. An additional argument is that the
class actions lawyers certainly contribute to the transmission of information
between the members.
In the existing literature on the economics of class actions, it is more usual
to nd arguments regarding the opportunistic/strategic behaviours of one of the
three parties involves in mass tort litigation (plainti¤s, defendants or their at-
torneys) as a result of the existence of informational asymmetries. A specic line
of research has discussed the existence of, and solution to, agency problems be-
tween attorneys and their clients. The main issue is how to monitor the e¤ort un-
dertaken by attorney for the time they spend to their clientscase, and give them
e¢ cient incentives to maximize their clients recovery. In particular, the rational
for the use of contingent fees (Klement and Neeman (2004), Lynk (1990,1994),
Miceli and Segerson (1991)), or conditional fees (Emons (2006,2007), Emons
and Garoupa (2006)), has been assessed.
Some authors have been more concerned with the relationships between
plainti¤s as members of a class action. Che (1996) for example analyzes the
role of asymmetries of information on the one hand between plainti¤s and the
defendant, and on the other hand between the members of the class action. Che
assumes that two kinds of plainti¤s (small claim, and large claim) sue against
the same tortfeasor, and have the opportunity to join a class action or to le in-
dividually. He nds a multiplicity of equilibria: either no class action is formed,
while there exists a potentially viable class action, or not all the plainti¤s are
allowed to join the class action (and speciclass actionlly, not all the smallest
or weakest victims), but many opt out. Marceau and Mongrain (2003) for their
own develop the idea that a class action has the characteristics of a public good,
although it is privately produced - since a class action is usually provided by
only a subset of plainti¤s. Once the class action is created against a tortfea-
sor, all the victims have the opportunity to join it, and thus benet from the
provision of the good without having to incur the initial cost associated to the
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formation of the class action. For the representative member, this cost is a sunk
cost, and it is borne only by the initiator of the class action. Hence, there is
a problem of free-riding, which is formalized by Marceau and Mongrain as a
war of attrition: on the one hand, each plainti¤ has an incentive to wait that
someone else initiates the class action (because of the sunk cost) but on the
second, he bears a penalty in waiting (time is also costly). The authors mainly
demonstrate that the identity of the class action initiator depends on the rule
of compensation awarded by courts to the class action members: small levels of
damage averaging tend to give incentives to the holder of the smallest claim to
be the initiator of the class action.
A more recent line of research addresses the issue of the deterrent e¤ects of
group versus individual litigation on the injurers misconduct. Saraceno (2008)
illustrates that group litigation does not always improve deterrence. Despite
the fact that group litigation facilitates access to justice for victims (through
the benets of scale economies and/or the improvement of their condence in
a trial), it creates additional transaction costs borne by victims. Moreover, the
aggregation of individual cases thanks to a group litigation enables the injurer
to reduce its liability costs, since it both facilitates settlement and reduces liti-
gation costs. The combined result of these various e¤ects might be a reduction,
rather than an increase, in the deterrent e¤ect of tort law. De¤ains and De-
mougin (2010) ndings are more favourable to the deterrence e¤ect of group
litigation, relying on a di¤erent argument. They assume that rms have intrin-
sic motivations (such as feelings of remorse, guilt, regret and/or shame). They
show that the standard aggregation argument in favor of class action holds,
increasing e¢ ciency due to lower litigation costs. In the short run intrinsically
motivated rms benet from the introduction of a class action procedure. In
the long run, new intrinsically motivated entrants are attracted in the market
thereby increasing consumer surplus. Overall, the average care level increases.
In the present paper, no asymmetric information exist between litigants, and
parties are unable to anticipate ex-ante the behavior of the court during the
trial. We rather focus on the impact of information sharing between plainti¤s
and we compare the case where class actions are forbidden to the case where
they are allowed. In many countries, procedural rules hold such that parties
have a free access to the evidences and the various documents that the other
party has gathered and will produce at trial. However, uncertainty remains as
to the outcome at trial given the existence of an heterogeneity in the decisions
of courts, concerning similar cases. A related problem is the emergence of new
legal doctrines. For example in the United States, the problem with the asbestos
litigation in the eightys comes partly from the fact that the legal doctrines to
apply was not yet developed. So in our work, the main source of uncertainty is
coming from the behavior of the courts.
We consider a situation where a given agent, for example through the oc-
currence of several successive individual accidents, injures a group of victims.
If class actions are forbidden, victims will individually enter into the litigation
process ling against the same tortfeasor according to a sequence of moves which
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is supposed exogeneously given1 . It follows that repeated trials entail positive
informational externalities which are benecial only to the later plainti¤s. The
earlier ones who are less informed may undertake strategies that otherwise they
would not choose to adopt with a better information. In contrast, the plainti¤s
who enter later on in the litigation process may benet from the experience of
the earlier ones and are allowed to undertake more accurate decisions regarding
the various legal options that are available (le or exit, go to trial, settle or give
up).
This is a passive transmission of information coming from the earlier plain-
ti¤s, but a problem arises because the rst plainti¤s have no means to benet
of the information collected by their successors or to retain privately part of the
benets associated to the positive informational externality they create. From
this perspective, the formation of a class action may be understood as a tool to
internalize these externalities. More generally, the formation of a class action
makes easier the transmission of information between the plainti¤s. As a conse-
quence, apart of economies of scales coming from the pooling of lawyers services,
we identify a new rationale to the formation of class actions which result from
information sharing between plainti¤s. Specically, the pooling of individual
information allows all of them to improve their individual assessment of the ex-
pected gain at trial. We focus on these incentives to share information between
plainti¤s suing the same tortfeasor and we investigate their consequences for
the existence of a class actions.
The paper develops as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 de-
rives the market equilibrium under di¤erent institutional frameworks (sequential
trial, information sharing). Section 4 discusses the specic issue with contingent
fees, and section 5 concludes. Proofs of propositions are in the appendix unless
statements are obvious from the text.
2 The model
2.1 The sequence of individual decisions
We consider a three-stage game, where plainti¤s enter sequentially in the litiga-
tion process against the defendant, such that P i is the rst ler. In stage 1, P i
may choose between two options: either he les or he exits. In this last case,
everything is over for him, and then, P j has only to decide for himself whether
he enters and les individually, or if he exits. If P i opts for ling, two options
are available to him: either he can sue individually, or he can decide to initiate a
CA, to which every individuals that have su¤ered a damage may join. In stage
1We were not aware of the existence of a recent contribution related to ours, i.e. Daughety
and Reinganum (2009), until we prepared the nal draft of the present paper. Two notice-
able di¤erences in assumptions exist: in Daughety and Reinganums paper, each plainti¤ has
private information about damages, and the timing of plainti¤s moves is endogenous. Fi-
nally, Daughety and Reinganum give a more comprehensive analysis of the possible equilibria,
including defendantsuse of preemptive settlement strategies.
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2 beginning after P is move, P j chooses either to sue individually or to register
to become a member of the class action.
We assume that the membership is voluntary and open, such that the pres-
ence of a class action does not legally compel other plainti¤s to join it, and no
individual plainti¤ is denied membership against his wishes. In practice, Courts
decide to maintain a class action or not, and prescribe deadlines for claimants
participation or opt out decisions. This framework reects the equilibrium be-
haviors of plainti¤s, in such a way that after a limited period of time during
which any individual has the opportunity to opt out, the membership becomes
binding: no class action member can opt out, and no new plainti¤ can opt in.
Moreover, once a class action is formed, which is requiring that more than one
plainti¤ register, it sues on behalf of all its members. Here, no di¤erence is
made between the case where the representative plainti¤ who has initiated the
class action litigates for all members, or the case where the active role is played
by the class actions lawyer. We assume that the delegation of the collective
negotiation power to one of the member or to a third party leads to no agency
problem and does not require any incentive scheme to monitor the e¤orts of
the class action representative agent, who is supposed always to act in the best
interest of all its members.
In stage 3, pretrial negotiations may also take place, leading to an amicable
settlement of claims rather than their litigation at trial. That is, after that
a suit (individual or collective) is brought against the defendant, this one has
the opportunity to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the other party (individual
plainti¤ or class action). Thus, either the defendants o¤er is accepted (by a
plainti¤ or the class action), and thus the claim is settled, or it is rejected. In
this event, we consider that either the claim goes to trial, or the plainti¤ gives
up.
As for the courts behavior, it is assumed that the judge awards a compen-
satory damage equal to the claim of the defendant in case of an individual suit,
while he sets the damage obtained by each member of a class action equal to an
index of the aggregate merit of the class, which is dened as  = i+(1 )j ,
with  2]0; 1[ being either the proportion of plainti¤s i in the population of l-
ers, or an parameter of the discretion power of judges. The role of this rule
of damage averaging is part of the present paper, and the distinction between
those possible explanations will be discussed in the last part of the paper.
The individual outcomes depend on the various litigation expenditures in-
curred by the plainti¤, since ling a suit is a costly activity. When lling an
individual suit both plainti¤s bear the same litigation costs, which are of two
kinds. The rst one corresponds to the administrative registration of the claim,
C > 0; which is supposed to be a sunk cost: whatever his decision, either he
maintains his action until it is settled through a negotiation with the defendant
or at trial, or he gives up after registration, the plainti¤ never recovers this ex-
penditure. The second one, Cp > 0 , corresponds to litigation costs per se such
as attorney fees, auditing or expertise costs and so on, that are borne only when
the plainti¤ les, to produce evidences in order to strengthen the courts beliefs
that the defendant is liable. In contrast, joining a class action allows plainti¤s
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to litigate for smaller individual costs, Kp > 0: Moreover, members of the class
action incur an additional sunk cost K > 0 (corresponding to registration costs
and various administrative costs). We assume that:
Assumption 1: j > i > Cp
Assumption 2: 0 < Kp < Cp; and 0 < K < Kp
which means that if a plainti¤ were aware of the defendants liability, he
would be prone to sue individually. Notice that the conditions of assumption 2
put on the various transaction costs simply insures that a class action entails
scales economies on the various litigation costs: C + Cp > K + Kp. Scales
economies achieved through the pooling of attorneys services and the decrease
in the number of plainti¤s individual appearances in front of the court, are a
classical motive to explain the great appeal of class actions.
The denition of the nature of both kinds of costs are introduced for ease
of exposition. The clue of the story is coming from the distinction between
an entry cost which is paid in order that the plainti¤ have an access to the
litigation process, on the one hand, and a cost paid only when the plainti¤
continues his suit until the end at trial, on the second. Notice that a more sensible
interpretation would consider that C as K correspond both to administrative
costs per se coming from the registration of the claim in from of the court plus
the various sunk costs associated to the use of attorneys counsels (xed costs
such as ling costs, including expertise expenditures) during the pretrial period,
whereas Cp as Kp would include more strictly only the expenditures incurred
by the plainti¤ when his case goes to trial, for instance those corresponding to
the lawyer fees.
Finally, we assume that the rate of impatience is null for all agents.
2.2 The technology of information and beliefs updating
rules
In our set up, as the plainti¤s enter sequentially in the litigation process, the
timing of information arrival is stylized as follows:
Figure 1
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We consider circumstances where all the information which may be obtained
(the set of all possible messages) by P j is the same as what is available for the
former P i . Thus, everything goes as if the messages successively obtained by
the litigants were initially drowned in the same set of messages2 . But, basically,
although both plainti¤s have access to the same technology of information, they
have not the ability to update their initial beliefs using the same information:
plainti¤ Pi enters rst and only observes his own message, while plainti¤ Pj ob-
serve a combination of two messages, consisting in his own message and plainti¤
P 0is personal message.
In order to describe the technology of information, we retain a specication in
terms of joint probabilities which may appear as poorly intuitive. Nevertheless,
this is the more general and straightforward way, since we are more interested
with the benets associated with the process of beliefs updating allowed by this
technology, than on the distortions coming from di¤erence between pure indi-
vidual subjective priors. Anyway, any service of messages reveals the existence
of such a joint probability distribution (see Hirschleifer and Riley (1997), Laf-
font (2000) for the basic case of an unidimensional technology of information).
Formally, let us denote 
 the set of all available messages providing some piece
of evidence with respect to the liability or guiltiness of the defendant. When the
Pi (respectively Pj) pays the litigation costs, he receives a message ! (respec-
tively !0) randomly picked in 
; which will be used to improve his assessment of
the likelihood that the defendant will be found liable/not liable at trial. Since
we consider the case of an aggregate technology of information, let us take as
a primitive the joint probability distribution P : S  
  
 ! [0; 1]; where
S = fL;NLg is the set of relevant states of the nature regarding the status
of the defendant (Liable, Non liable); p(L; !; !0)  0 is the likelihood that the
defendant is liable and the messages obtained respectively by plainti¤s i and j
are (!; !0); while p(NL;!; !0)  0 is the likelihood that the defendant is non
liable and the messages obtained respectively by P i and Pj are (!; !0).
We have to consider the various probabilities which are relevant in order
to describe the informational status of plainti¤s, at each stage of the litigation
process. Specically, our general assumption implies that individuals have com-
mon priors, but that beliefs updating allows them to have di¤erent posteriors.
First, the primitives are connected to the plainti¤scommon priors on the
defendants liability in a simple way:
pL =
X
(!;!0)2
2
p(L; !; !0)
pNL =
X
(!;!0)2
2
p(NL;!; !0)
Using the available technology of information, the plainti¤s are also allowed
to assess their chances to obtain additional information. For example:
2Thus, under some circumstances, plainti¤ j may receive exactly the same message as
plainti¤ i: the weight of evidence or the signicance of the message is increased in such a case.
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pi(!) =
X
!02

p(L; !; !0) +
X
!02

p(NL;!; !0)
represents P is individual priors to obtain an individual message, when the
message obtained by the other plainti¤ is not observable. In our set up, where
P j les after P i , we are interested by the case where P j has the opportunity
to observe also the message previously obtained by i; hence, the probability of
such an event according to the technology of information at hand is:
pj(!; !0) = p(L; !; !0) + pNL(!; !0)
As a consequence, P j will update his beliefs according to the rule:
(R1) : pj(Lj!; !0) = p(L; !; !
0)
p(L; !; !0) + p(NL;!; !0)
when he observes both his own message and the message of the other plainti¤,
but P i can only condition his revision of beliefs on a unique message according
to the rule:
(R2) : pi(Lj!) =
P
!02
 p(L; !; !
0)P
!02
 p(L; !; !0) +
P
!02
 p(NL;!; !0)
with:
p(L;w) =
X
!02

p(L; !; !0)
In this context, the possible evidences that may be gathered during the
discovery process does not change after that P i eventually les and before P j
decides to enter. Nevertheless, P j may benet of the message obtained by P i
(he benets of the e¤orts undertaken by the former in the discovery process).
Thus, he may update his likelihood of success according to both messages.3
3 Institutional framework and equilibrium
We rst introduce as a benchmark model the case of a system allowing only
individual suits: thus two repeated trials occur. Then, we introduce the possi-
bility of a class action, plainti¤ having the opportunity either to sue individually
of to register a class action.
3 In some circumstances however, P j may gather an additional information, which is
whether the evidence that should have been by the previous plainti¤ (even when he only
obtained partial information) is or not always available or true. In words, some events previ-
ously unbelievable are now available as pieces of evidence, and more specically are seen as
acceptable by Courts (unforseen contingencies).
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3.1 Precedents, repeated trials and pure individual suits
When repeated trials occur (Ps case is rst settled), the last ler may benet
of the existence of jurisprudence or precedents as a result of a pure informational
e¤ect. We investigate how this involuntary sharing of information between plain-
ti¤s a¤ects the individual incentives to le.
Assume that the class action is not allowed as a litigation option: plainti¤s
can le only an individual suit. Playersmoves in stage 3 are the following: for
the defendant, make an individual o¤er Oi (Oj) for plainti¤ i (respectively j);
and each individual plainti¤ may choose between: go to trial T ; exit E; settle
S). Let us denote s(i; !) and s(j ; !; !0) the settlement o¤er made by the
defendant respectively to P i and P j .
When a case is litigated, any information which is revealed is always shared
between the plainti¤ and the defendant. In the present set up, the defendant
always exercise his rights to the discovery process, since it allows him either to
settle for an o¤er lesser than when the plainti¤ is silent, and/or to litigate while
saving the trial costs. The following lemma rst solves for the e¢ cient decision
of the defender and the response of the plainti¤s when the last stage of the game
is seen as a one-shotbargaining process, exhibited in gure 2:
Figure 2
Lemma 1 Consider plainti¤s and defendants moves in stage 3:
i) For any message ! 2 
, corresponding to the information obtained by Pi ,
the best one shot individual o¤er made by the defendant to plainti¤ Pi is:
s(i; !) = max
 
0; pj(Lj!)i   Cp

. Pi accepts this o¤er.
ii) For any combination of messages (!; !0) 2 
  
, corresponding to the
information obtained by Pj , the best one shot individual o¤er made by the
defendant to plainti¤ Pj is s(j ; !; !0) = max(0; pj(Lj!; !0)j Cp). Pj accepts
this o¤er.
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All proofs of the paper are in the appendix. Note that for concreteness,
we adopt in the paper the convention that the indi¤erence between trial and
settlement amounts to a strict preference for the settlement (see the discussion
in Rasmusen (2001), Shavell (1989)).
Coming back to stage 2, P j evaluates his own opportunity to le or not. Let
us denote his expected utility level given the various possible messages that he
may receive as follows:
Euj(j ; p
j(Lj:; :)) =
X
(!;!0)2
2
pj(!; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp
  C
while, conditional on its priors, his expected utility level is:
Euj(j ; pL) = pLj   Cp   C
The following lemma analyses when plainti¤ Pj sues or gives up.
Lemma 2 i) Assume that only good newsare expected to arrive; then, infor-
mation is not worth for Pj i.e.:
if min

pj(Lj!; !0); for all (!; !0) 2 
 
	  Cp
j
, then:
Euj(j ; p
j(Lj:; :)) = pLj   Cp   C
ii) Assume that there exists a unique combination of messages (!^; !^0) 2

  
 such that p(L; !^; !^0)  Cpj ; then, information is worth for Pj , i.e. :
Euj(j ; p
j(Lj:; :))  Euj(j ; pL)  0:
iii) Assume that there exists at least one combination of messages (!^; !^0) 2

  
 such that p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Cj ; then Pj always les individually, i.e.
Euj(j ; p
j(Lj:; :))  0.
Part i) implies that if priors are optimistic for P j , then P j always les,
i.e. pL  Cp+Cj =) Euj(j ; pj(Lj:; :))  0, but if pL <
Cp+C
j
then the plainti¤
gives up (Euj(j ; pj(Lj:; :)) < 0).
Part ii) means that if priors are pessimistic for P j , then P j may never-
theless le, i.e. we may have Euj(j ; pj(Lj:; :))  0 although pL  Cp+Cj .
Part iii) means that once there exists a very good news, the plainti¤ always
prefer to le an individual suit.
The same qualitative results also apply to P i : in stage 1, he evaluates the
opportunity to le or not without the knowledge of the relevant message that
will be available in the future, but only knowing the set of possible messages
a¤orded by the available technology of information. Let us dene by:
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Eui(i; p
i(Lj:)) =
X
!2

pi(!)max
 
0; pi(Lj!)i   Cp
  C
his expected utility level associated to the technology of information, and:
Eui(i; pL) = pLi   Cp   C
his satisfaction level associated to his priors, which are the same as the other
plainti¤. Thus, we have:
Lemma 3 i) Assume that only good newsare expected to arrive; then, infor-
mation is not worth for Pi , i.e.:
if min

pi(Lj!); for all ! 2 
	  Cp
i
, then:
Eui(i; p
i(Lj:)) = pLi   Cp   C
ii) Assume that there exists a unique message !^ 2 
 such that p(L; !^)  Cpi ;
then, information is worth for Pi , i.e.: Eui(i; pi(Lj:))  Eui(i; pL)  0:
iii) Assume that there exists at least one message !^ 2 
 such that p(L; !^) 
Cp+C
i
; then Pi always les individually, i.e. Eui(i; pi(Lj:))  0.
Considering together lemma 2 and 3, we obtain the conditions under which
entering the discovery process is worth to a plainti¤. Information has a positive
value in the present context only when litigants know that bad news sometimes
may be obtained. With additional information, a plainti¤ updates his priors,
and he is allowed to undertake the best possible decision in every circumstances,
given that he can exercise an exit option if the information learned appears to
be unfavorable for his case.
In this sense, the updating of beliefs may explain that holders of nuisance
suits or pessimistic victims (conditionally on their priors: i.e. pL Cp C < 0)
have an incentive to le, in the hope to learn good news in the future and pursue
until trial their action. In this last case, it depends on stronger conditions on the
technology of information. This is highlighted in parts iii) of the lemmas. Each
gives a simple su¢ cient condition required whatever the priors (optimistic or
pessimistic) in order to induce a plainti¤ to le an individual lawsuit, saying that
the plainti¤ knows that there exists at least a very favorable message entailing
a large probability that the defendant will be seen liable by the court. This last
result may be understood as follows: it is not worth that a plainti¤ expect to
always receive a favorable message in the future; in contrast, in order to induce
him to le a suit, it is su¢ cient that there a single favorable message exists,
given that in others circumstances, he will be induced to give up having only
paid the administrative sunk costs.
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In contrast, part i) of both lemmas shows interestingly enough that when the
available (technology of) information does not allow the possibility of bad events
or news, such that the plainti¤s expect to obtain a positive payment from the
defendant in any future event, then the discovery process provides no additional
value in the sense that whether plainti¤s update their priors depending on the
new message collected or use their priors, in both cases they undertake the same
e¢ cient decision.
Lemmas 1 to 3 lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Assume that there exists at least one combination of messages
(!^; !^0) 2 
  
 such that p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Ci ; then there exists a Subgame
Perfect Equilibrium where i) each plainti¤ le individually, and ii) both cases
are settled.
The requirement that there exists a p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Ci also implies that
p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Cj ; meaning that any information delivered by the technology
which appears as favorable for Pi is also good for Pj . As it is easily seen, this
is a weak requirement in the sense that it is su¢ cient that plainti¤s are aware
of the fact that there is one chance to obtain at least a good information, to
induce them to le a suit. There is no need to be sure that good news always
arrive in the future.
The next corollary is also a straightforward consequence of the previous
lemmas:
Corollary 5 If information has a positive value, then:
i) Any information favorable to the defendant (respectively, to the plainti¤s)
reduces (increases) the settlement o¤er, as compared to the case where no no
additional information arrives.
ii) The probability of settlement is smaller than one.
For the sake of proof, consider the rst plainti¤s decision - the argument
is the same for the second one. An information favorable to the defendant cor-
responds to a message satisfying: pL > pi(Lj!), which implies pLi   Cp >
pi(Lj!)i   Cp; the reverse inequalities apply in case of an information fa-
vorable to the plainti¤. Now, in the case where information is worth, there
is only a subset i  
 of possible messages for the rst plainti¤ such that
pi(Lj!)i   Cp > 0, 8! 2 i : then, the probability of settlement corresponds
to the cumulative probability that the plainti¤ obtains these favorable messagesP
!2i p(!) < 1:
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3.2 Information sharing in Class Action
We now assume that class actions are available.
To begin with, let us focus more specically on the proper subgame beginning
after P j decides to adhere to the class actions. In stage 3, the defender makes an
o¤er to the members, such that when the information pooled by the members
of the class action corresponds to the messages (!; !0), the settlement benet
of each member is s(; !; !0).
Figure 3
Lemma 6 Consider the decision node in stage 3 where the defendant is facing
a class action. For any combination of messages (!; !0) 2 

, the best one
shotindividual o¤er made by the defendant to the class action is: s(; !; !0) =
max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0) Kp

. The CA members accept this o¤er.
This implies that the defendant makes a positive o¤er to the Class Action
soon as pj(Lj!; !0) > Kp : On the other hand, in any proper subgame in stage 3
beginning after that P i gives up to initiate a class action, or after that P i gives
up to join it, the best individual o¤ers of the defendant are those of lemma 1
(see also gure 3 where these subgames have been replaced by the defendants
best o¤er).
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We can now analyze the e¢ cient decisions of P j , considering separately the
decision to join or not the class action (decision node following the entry of P j),
and nally the decision to le or not (decision node initiating the subgame of
gure 3). P js e¢ cient decisions in stage 2 may be as follows:
Lemma 7 Assume that there exists a subset of combinations of messages j 

2 such that for any (!; !0) 2 j : p(L; !; !0)  Cp+Cj ; and assume that  
  Cp Kp(j i) where  = max

pj(Lj!; !0); for all (!; !0) 2 j
	
. Then, i) Pj
always les in the second stage, and ii) he prefers to join the class action when
it has been initiated by Pi rather than to sue individually.
The following lemma focuses on the decision of the rst plainti¤.
Lemma 8 Assume that there exists a subset of messages i  
, such that for
any ! 2 i : pi(L; !)  Cp+Ci . Then, Pi always les in the rst stage, and he
prefers to initiate the class action rather than to sue individually.
Using the results of lemmas 6 to 8, we have:
Proposition 9 Assume that: (C1) there exists a unique combination of mes-
sages (!; !0) 2 
2 such that p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Ci , and (C2):   ^ 
Cp Kp
pj(Lj!^;!^0)(j i) :
Then, there exists a SPE where i) the class action is formed, and ii) the aggre-
gate case is settled.
Proposition 9 displays a set of su¢ cient conditions in order that the class
action comprising both types of individuals exists in equilibrium.
The result of proposition 9 is a direct consequence of our technology of
information, and of our assumption that the discovery process is perfect allowing
a perfect mutualization of information between plainti¤s and the defendant. In
such a case, the two important issues are 1/ whether the rst plainti¤ prefers
the structure of information dened by the set of his own personal messages, or
the structure associated to the combination of two messages, his personal one
and the information of the other plainti¤; 2/ whether the second one obtains a
higher payments when he becomes a member of the class action or not.
In our set up, P j observes his own message and the rst plainti¤s one
whether or not he joins the class action; thus, he prefers to join the class action
as long as the decrease in the litigation costs associated to the collective action
(Kp < Cp) is not fully compensated by the decrease in the expected payment
awarded at trial given that the court uses an index of the aggregate claim in
case of a class action ( < j): (C2) corresponds to the requirement needed to
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insure the participation of Pj : it must be that the proportion of large stakes in
population of plainti¤ is high enough.
On the other hand, the basic reason explaining why the rst plainti¤ initi-
ates the class action, is that when the discovery process is perfect, the posteriors
distribution pj(Lj:; :) is more informative in the sense of Blackwell (1953) than
the posteriors distribution pj(Lj:): for any message ! 2 
; there always exists
at least one message !0 2 
 such that: pj(Lj!; !0) > pi(Lj!) and one mes-
sage !00 2 
 such that: pj(Lj!; !00) < pi(Lj!). Thus, the posterior beliefs
pi(Lj:) provides the plainti¤ with some information which has been garbled
in the transmission as compared to the priors pj(Lj:; :). Anything goes as if the
information associated to pj(Lj:; :) were sent, but it has been received by Pi
with some additional noise, such that nally Pi recognized only the information
attached to pi(Lj:):
It is straightforward to verify that when plainti¤s having large stake become
the rst lers, nothing more is added to the results, since the class action is
formed under the same conditions as those in proposition 9. Thus, the order
of plainti¤sentry entails here no strategic aspect in contrast to what occurs
in Daughety and Reinganum (2009), Mongrain and Marceau (2003), Saraceno
(2008).
4 The case with conditional fees
One way to understand the results of the previous section is the following: for
plainti¤s, the opportunity to obtain additional information may work as a cred-
ible threat in order to obtain recovery from the defendant, although they have
pessimistic beliefs before trial. In this section, we introduce contingent fees as an
alternative for attorneyearnings. An argument in favor of contingent or condi-
tional fees is that they induce the absence of risk of lling a lawsuit for plainti¤s,
since the risk is borne by the attorney: plainti¤s owe their attorney a fee only
when there is recovery, i.e. when they win at trial.4 In the present set up, the
rational for conditional fees is assessed in terms of information acquisition.
When conditional fees are introduced, a plainti¤ pays the amount corre-
sponding to his attorneys services only in the case where he wins at trial.
Hence, the expected payment at trial is equal to the probability to win (given
the relevant information.) times his damage award minus attorneys fees:
pi(Lj!)(i   Cp) : for Pi
pj(Lj!; !0)(j   Cp) : for Pj
pj(Lj!; !0) ( Kp) : for a Class Action
The following proposition shows that as compared to the decisions based on
4The other advantage is that they enable plainti¤s to monitor the e¤ort undertaken by
attorney for the time they spend to their clients case, and give them e¢ cient incentives to
maximize their clients recovery (for references, see the introduction of the paper).
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the priors, the arrival of new information during the litigation process does not
change plainti¤s decision .
Proposition 10 Under conditional fees:
i) Parties always settle.
ii) The value of information is null for both plainti¤s.
iii) the settlement o¤ers are larger than under the xed costs rule
Proposition 10 shows that plainti¤s become neutral to the arrival of news
when contingent fees are used, such that the decision to le depends only on
their initial belief of the outcome at trial. This suggests that if contingent fees
may solve agency problems between plainti¤s and their counsel, on the other
hand they may entail pervasive e¤ects such as making victims not enough careful
with the arrival of new information.
The intuition is the following. Consider a plainti¤ with an initial belief on
his case, who wants to verify the quality of his claim at trial: he may use a
simple testcorresponding to buying the services of a lawyer; this last one will
inform the plainti¤whether he has a high probability to win at trial or a law one,
and when alternative litigation strategies may be used at trial, contingent fees
monitors attorneys e¤orts to choose the strategy leading to maximal recovery
for plainti¤. Proposition 10 tells us that this test is of no value for the plainti¤:
his initial decision to enter or not depends only on his prior beliefs on his case,
when contingent fees are used, since in case of an individual suit for example
we have: Eui(i; pi(Lj:)) = Eui(i; pL) and Euj(j ; pj(Lj:; :)) = Euj(j ; pL).
When contingent fees are used, a plainti¤ pays an amount corresponding to
a xed percentage of the value of the claim only in case of recovery, i.e. the
costs corresponding to the payment of attorneysservices is proportional to the
expected value of the claim; in such a case, the value of the expected outcome
at trial is a given percentage of the claim:.
pi(Lj!)(1  t)i : for Pi
pj(Lj!; !0)(1  t)j : for Pj
pj(Lj!; !0)(1  ) : for a CA
with t (respectively ) 2]0; 1[ being the percentage of the value of the claim
in case of an individual action (collective action) charged by the attorney, and
t > : It is straightforward to verify that a similar result applies.
5 Conclusion
The present paper illustrates that the existence of positive informational exter-
nalities and the opportunity of information sharing could be a strong motive
for the formation of a class action. In our set up, the discovery process is such
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that, whatever the available information, plainti¤s are not condent with re-
spect to their chances of success at trial, i.e. they can not know whether the
judge will be favorable to their case; on the one and, it is relatively easy to
assess the value of individual damages (which may be considered as a public
information), but on the second, the cause of the victimsinjury may be quite
di¢ cult or costly to establish; thus, the plainti¤sindividual assessment of the
likelihood to win at trial are always smaller than unity. Each plainti¤ evaluates
ex-ante the opportunity to le a suit or to give up, knowing that he will benet
of a new information later on and that the additional informations will generate
a new assessment of his chances at trial, such that he will undertake ex-post
the best decision conditionally on his information. In this way, we capture two
salient points of the litigation process: i) a main relevant source of uncertainty
for parties is created by the behavior of the court that is unknown ex-ante. ii)
Scientic evidences are imperfect, some of them may be strongly controversial,
there may exist a large disagreement between expertsopinions, judges may have
bias of judgment, mistaken beliefs, and/or unfortunately reject some pieces of
evidences. Our main result is that the opportunity to constitute a class action
is not always exploited since, apart of scales economies, it depends on whether
the discovery process provides good news as welle as bad news. Finally, we nd
that the contingent fees system reduces the incentives to organize class actions
on an information sharing basis, in the sense that it renders plainti¤s neutral
to the arrival of news.
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APPENDIX
Proof of lemma 1:
Given that the administrative cost C is sunk, it is easy to see that when
P j obtains the message !0 after that P i has received message !, the defen-
dant chooses a take-it-or-leave-ito¤er in order to render the plainti¤ indi¤er-
ent between going to trial (suing) or accepting the o¤er: hence s(j ; !; !0) =
max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp

, where pj(Lj!; !0) follows R1. Symmetrically, when
he faces the message ! with P i , the defendant makes a take-it-ot-leave-it
o¤er in order to render the plainti¤ indi¤erent between going to trial (suing)
or accepting the o¤er: hence s(i; !) = max
 
0; pi(Lj!)i   Cp

, where pi(Lj!)
follows R2. Hence the result. 
Proof of lemma 2:
i) Consider that min

pj(Lj!; !0);8(!; !0) 2 
 
	  Cpj ; thus, 8(!; !0) 2

  
, it comes that max  0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp = pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp, such
that:
X
(!;!0)2
2
pj(!; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp
  C
=
X
(!;!0)2
2
pj(!; !0)
 
pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp
  C
= pLj   Cp   C
given that, by construction of the technology of information, we have both:
X
(!;!0)2
2
pj(!; !0) = 1;
X
(!;!0)2
2
pj(!; !0)pj(Lj!; !0) =
X
(!;!0)2
2
p(L; !; !0) = pL
Hence the result.
ii) More generally, given that 8(!; !0) 2 

 : max  0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp 
pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp, we have after multiplying both terms of this inequality by
pj(!; !0) and then summing over all the possible messages:X
(!;!0)2
2
pj(!; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp
  C

X
(!;!0)2
2
pj(!; !0)
 
pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp
  C
= pLj   Cp   C
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Hence Euj(j ; pj(Lj:; :))  Euj(j ; pL), which is by denition the value of
the information a¤orded by the available technology of messages. Thus, assum-
ing a unique combination (!; !0) 2 

 : such thatmax  0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp =
pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp, the result is direct.
iii) Let us assume that there exists at least one combination of messages
(!^; !^0) 2 
 
 such that p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Cj ; remark that this implies:
pj(Lj!^; !^0) = p(L; !^; !^
0)
pj(!^; !^0)
 Cp
pj(!^; !^0)j
 Cp
j
As a result, it comes that:
Euj(j ; p
j(Lj:; :)) = pj(!^; !^0)  pj(Lj!^; !^0)j   Cp
+
X
(!;!0) 6=(!^;!^0)
pj(!; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp
  C
 p(L; !^; !^0)j   pj(!^; !^0)Cp   C
 p(L; !^; !^0)j   Cp   C
since by construction
P
(!;!0) 6=(!^;!^0) p
j(!; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp
 
0: Now, given that p(L; !^; !^0)j   Cp   C  0 by assumption, we obtain
Euj(j ; p
j(Lj:; :))  0. Hence the result. 
Proof of lemma 3: omitted (qualitatively the same as in lemma 2).
Proof of proposition 4:
More specically, we prove the following results:
Claim 11 Assume that there exists at least one combination of messages (!^; !^0) 2


 such that p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Ci ; then there is a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
which corresponds to the following set of actions:
1/ Each plainti¤ les individually.
2/ The defendant makes two individual o¤ers:
s(i; !) = max
 
0; pi(Lj!)i   Cp

;8! 2 
 for Pi , and
s(j ; !; !
0) = max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp

;8(!; !0) 2 
 
 for Pj
3/ Each plainti¤ accepts (at each decision node where he has to play) his
specic individual o¤er proposed by the defendant, for every possible information
he may receive.
Proof of claim 13. To prove 1/ it is su¢ cient to remark that if there exists
at least one combination of messages (!^; !^0) 2 
  
 such that p(L; !^; !^0) 
Cp+C
i
, then we also have:
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- p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Cj ; thus, by part v) of lemma 2, P j always les, given that
he accepts any o¤er s(j ; !; !0) = max
 
0; pj(Lj!^; !^0)j   Cp

;
- pi(L; !^)  P!02
 p(L; !^; !0) > p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Ci ; thus, by part v) of
lemma 3, P i accepts the o¤er s(i; !) = max
 
0; pi(Lj!^)i   Cp

; and he always
les. 2/ and 3/ are direct from lemma 1. 
Proof of lemma 6: as lemma 1, it is straightforward since K is sunk. 
Proof of lemma 7:
Consider the subgame where the defendant o¤ers s(j ; !; !0) to Pj , which
is accepted. Remark rst that if the subset j  
2 exists, for any (!; !0) 2
j ; P j may obtain a positive payment equal to max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp

=
pj(Lj!; !0)j  Cp  0. Thus, following the proof of part v) in lemma 2, had he
decided to sue individually, P 0j s expected utility level would be positive since:
Euj(j ; p
j(Lj:; :)) 
X
(!;!0)2j
p(L; !; !0)j   Cp   C  0
given that by construction for any (!; !0) 2 j : p(L; !; !0)j  Cp + C:
Now for any message (!; !0) 2 
  
, in order that P j be better o¤ when he
joins the CA rather than to have sued individually, it must be that:
pj(Lj!; !0) Kp  pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp
which is true as far as   Cp Kppj(Lj!;!0)(j i) . Hence assume that  
  Cp Kp(j i) where  = max

pj(Lj!; !0); for all (!; !0) 2 j
	
; then for
any (!; !0) 2 j :
pj(Lj!; !0) Kp  K  pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp  K  pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp   C
Finally, after multiplying both the LHS and the RHS terms of this inequality
by pj(!; !0) and then summing over all the possible messages, we obtain:
Euj(; p
j(Lj:; :))  Euj(j ; pj(Lj:; :))  0
Hence the result. 
Proof of lemma 8:
The crucial issue is whether the rst plainti¤ prefers the structure of infor-
mation dened only by the set of his own personal messages, or the structure of
information associated to the set of combinations of two messages, his personal
ones and the messages of the other plainti¤. We shall show that the second
one is more informative in the sense of Blackwell (1953) than the rst one; as a
result, Pi obtains a higher expected utility with the second one.
To understand this, remark that by (R2) for any message ! 2 
 we have:
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pi(Lj!) =
X
!02

p(L; !; !0)P
!02
 p(L; !; !0) +
P
!02
 p(NL;!; !0)
=
X
!02


p(L; !; !0) + p(NL;!; !0)P
!02
 p(L; !; !0) +
P
!02
 p(NL;!; !0)

p(L; !; !0)
p(L; !; !0) + p(NL;!; !0)

which means that the following relationship linking P 0is the two types of
posterior beliefs pi(Lj:) and pj(Lj:; :) always applies:
8! 2 
 : pi(Lj!) =
X
!02

(!; !0)pj(Lj!; !0) (1)
with (!; !0) = p
i(!;!0)
pi(!) < 1 and
P
!02
 (!; !
0) = 1; meaning that the poste-
riors pj(Lj:; :) are more spread than the posteriors pj(Lj:); i.e. for any message
! 2 
; there always exists at least one message !0 2 
 such that: pj(Lj!; !0) >
pi(Lj!); and there always exists at least one message !00 2 
 such that: pj(Lj!; !00) <
pi(Lj!): By denition, this amounts to say that the posteriors pj(Lj:; :) are more
informative than the posteriors pj(Lj:). This is useful in the rest of the proof.
When Pi initiates a CA, and when Pj joins it, information sharing between
plainti¤s leads to an expected utility level for the former which is by denition:
Eui(; p
j(Lj:; :)) =
X
(!;!0)2
2
pi(!; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0) Kp
 K
with pi(Lj!; !0) = pj(Lj!; !0); 8(!; !0) 2 
2, whereas if Pi les an individual
suit, he obtains:
Eui(i; p
i(Lj:)) =
X
!2

pi(!)max
 
0; pi(Lj!)i   Cp
  C
Hence, Pi initiates the CA more particularly soon as:
Eui(; p
j(Lj:; :))  Eui(i; pi(Lj:))  0 (2)
Let us exhibit simple conditions under which the RHS inequality in (2) is
true. For that, assume that there exists a subset of message i  
 such that
any !^ 2 i satises: pi(L; !^)  Cp+Ci ; which implies that pi(Lj!^) 
Cp
i
; as a
consequence, it is easy to see that:
Eui(i; p
i(Lj:)) =
X
!^2i
pi(!^)
 
pi(Lj!^)i   Cp
  C

X
!^2i
pi(L; !^)i   Cp   C
 0
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Remark now that by (1), we have pi(Lj!^)i Cp =
P
!02
 (!^; !
0)pj(Lj!^; !0)i 
Cp, for any any !^ 2 i; implying thus:
X
!02

(!^; !0)pj(Lj!^; !0)i   Cp 
X
!02

(!^; !0)
 
pj(Lj!^; !0)i   Cp


X
!02

(!^; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!^; !0)i   Cp

Pre-multiplying by pi(!^); summing over all !^ 2 i, and nally rearranging,
we obtain:
X
!^2i
pi(!^)
 
pi(Lj!^)i   Cp
  X
!^2i
X
!02

pi(!^)(!^; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!^; !0)i   Cp

=
X
!^2i
X
!02

pi(!^; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!^; !0)i   Cp


X
(!;!0)2
2
pi(!; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)i   Cp

= Eui(i; p
j(Lj:; :))
Now, given that > i and using assumption 2, it comes that: Eui(; pj(Lj:; :)) 
Eui(i; p
j(Lj:; :)): Hence (2) holds, and the lemma 8 is proven: 
Proof of proposition 9:
Once more, we prove the following claim:
Claim 12 Assume that: (C1) there exists a unique combination of messages
(!; !0) 2 
2 such that p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Ci , and (C2):   ^ 
Cp Kp
pj(Lj!^;!^0)(j i) :
Then, there is a SPE associated to the following set of actions:
1/ Each plainti¤ les.
2/ Pi initiates the CA, and Pj joins it.
3/ The defendant makes three o¤ers:
s(i; !) = max
 
0; pi(Lj!)i   Cp

;8! 2 
 for Pi
s(j ; !; !
0) = max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp

;8(!; !0) 2 
 
 for Pj
s(; !; !0) = max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0) Kp

;8(!; !0) 2 
 
 for a Class Action
4/ At each decision node in stage 3 where he has to choose an action, each
plainti¤ accepts the o¤er (either individually or as a member of the CA) proposed
by the defendant, for every possible information they may receive.
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Once more, we do not tackle with the problem of multiplicity of equilibria,
only focusing on the equilibrium path where the class action is formed.
Proof of claim 14. To prove 1/ and 2/ it is su¢ cient to remark that
if there exists a unique combination of messages (!^; !^0) 2 
  
 such that
p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Ci , then we also have:
- pj(Lj!^; !^0)  p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Cj ; thus, if  
Cp Kp
pj(Lj!^;!^0)(j i) by lemma
7, P j always les and joins the CA initiated by the other plainti¤;
- pi(Lj!^)  pi(L; !^)  p(L; !^; !^0)+P!0 6=!^0 p(L; !^; !0) > p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Ci ;
thus, by lemma 8, P i always les and initiated the CA,
Finally, 3/ and 4/ are direct from lemma 5. 
Proof of proposition 10:
Consider the case of the rst type of plainti¤s. Equivalent arguments may
be obtained in the case of the second plainti¤ and in the case of a CA.
When conditional or contingent fees are introduced, the defendants best
o¤ers to plainti¤ i in stage 3 are the following, under assumption 2:
s(i; !) = max
 
0; pi(Lj!)(i   Cp)

= pi(Lj!)(i   Cp) : under conditional fees
s(i; !) = max
 
0; pi(Lj!)(1  t)i

= pi(Lj!)(1  t)i : under contingent fees
i) Thus, whatever the message, the plainti¤ always obtains a positive pay-
ment - thus, he always accepts the defendants o¤er.
ii) As a result, the plainti¤individual expected utility level in case of indi-
vidual suits is equal to:
Eui(i; p
i(Lj:)) = pL(i   Cp)  C = Eui(i; pL) (3)
Notice that by assumption 1: Euj(j ; pL) > Eui(i; pL): It is straightfor-
ward to see that individual suits are both benecial for the plainti¤s soon as
Eui(i; pL)  0; meaning that their common priors must satisfy: pL  Ci Cp .
iii) Finally, both contingent and conditional fees (for a normalized cost :
ti = Cp) allows for higher settlement o¤ers, given that they induce a decrease
in the expected payments from plainti¤s to their attorney:
pi(Lj!)i   Cp > pi(Lj!)(i   Cp) : under conditional fees
pi(Lj!)i   Cp > pi(Lj!)(1  t)i : under contingent fees
as compared to the xed costs system of the previous section.
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